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Bank suspensions occurred in the United States several 
times in the second half of the 19th century and the 
early part of the 20th century, and they were widely 
viewed as both undesirable and avoidable. The view that 
bank suspensions should and could be avoided has 
played a decisive role in determining the nature of our 
current banking system. This view was the driving force 
behind the creation of the Federal Reserve System, a 
system which helped determine the course and severity 
of banking difficulties during the Great Depression. The 
experience of the Great Depression, in turn, produced 
our current financial system and our deposit insurance 
system with its attendant problems. 
In this paper I question the view that bank suspen-
sions are undesirable by providing a model of an 
economy in which a system with occasional partial 
suspension achieves the best possible outcome. By a 
partial suspension I mean a situation in which some 
depositors receive less than some other depositors 
merely because they withdraw later, after a (partial) 
suspension has been declared. This was a widely 
reported feature of the banking panic of 1907 and in one 
form or another must have been a feature of other 
suspension episodes. In the model I describe, the best 
possible arrangement has this feature. There is simply 
no better way to deal with randomness in withdrawal 
demands—which in this model arises exogenously, that 
is, naturally—than to declare a partial suspension. 
The model developed here is a variant of an earlier 
one (Wallace 1988), which itself was a variant of the 
well-known Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking. 
These models are ones in which individuals are uncer-
tain at the time they make deposits when they will want 
to make withdrawals. Deposits exist because they 
provide better withdrawal options than individuals could 
achieve on their own—but, under the assumptions made, 
only if the banking system takes on an illiquid portfolio. 
Diamond and Dybvig's article and my earlier article 
discussed two versions of our models, one in which 
individual uncertainty about the timing of withdrawals 
exactly averages out across people, a version without 
aggregate risk, and one in which it does not completely 
average out, a version with aggregate risk. 
The no-aggregate-risk version has the defect that a 
very simple banking arrangement achieves the best 
possible outcome, but despite banking system illiquidity, 
it is an arrangement that does not resemble the banking 
suspensions that we have from time to time experienced. 
The aggregate-risk version is more promising in this 
regard, but in general is very complicated. In Wallace 
1988, I established only a limited property of desirable 
arrangements for the aggregate-risk version: In the best 
arrangement, withdrawal options are somewhat depen-
dent on when individuals attempt to withdraw. Here I 
look at a special case of the aggregate-risk version with 
a small amount of aggregate risk, all of which is limited 
to a group who show up last. Although this case is 
somewhat special, it is easy to describe the best arrange-
11 ment for it. Under the assumptions that imply banking 
system illiquidity, the best arrangement has partial 
suspension: when the late-to-show-up group want to 
withdraw, they get less than those who withdrew earlier. 
Moreover, as I will discuss later, arrangements that 
resemble partial suspension are likely to emerge from 
less special specifications with aggregate risk. 
In my model, the cause of a bank run and a partial 
suspension is exogenous—an aggregate shock to tastes 
that makes the number of people wanting to withdraw 
unusually large. No attempt is made here to argue that 
this was the main cause of bank runs and suspensions in 
the historical episodes mentioned above. Rather, the 
argument here is that the crucial elements of the model 
are plausible features of actual economies. Since these 
plausible features by themselves imply that the best 
arrangement has partial suspensions, partial suspensions 
per se should not be grounds for indicting a banking 
system. 
The Model 
The model has three main ingredients. One ingredient is 
that at the time that individuals make decisions about 
what assets to hold, individuals are uncertain about 
when they will want to dispose of their assets in order 
to spend. A second ingredient is that individuals are 
naturally isolated from each other in a way which forces 
banks and the business sector to deal with customers 
sequentially. The third ingredient is that real investment 
opportunities have relatively good returns if they are not 
interrupted. Although these ingredients seem straightfor-
ward, it is not easy to put them together so that their 
implications for what is possible and desirable can be 
deduced. Doing that requires that these fairly plausible 
ingredients fit into a picture of an entire economy that 
we can understand. That, in turn, requires some drastic 
simplifications which I now describe. 
Suppose there are N people, where N should be 
thought of as large, and three time periods, labeled 0, 1, 
and 2. There is a single good at each period, which is 
the economy's consumption good. The economy starts 
out with some of this good at period 0. Denote the per-
capita amount of this by y. A technology is also avail-
able which allows this good at period 0 to be used to 
produce consumption at period 1 and period 2. If ;t is 
the period 0 input into this technology, then Rxx is the 
period 1 output, R, being the return between periods 0 
and 1. Any output removed from the production process 
during period 1—call it XR}x for some X between 0 and 
1—must be consumed or it is lost. The part of R}x not 
removed from the production process, (1 - X)Rlx, 
becomes R2( 1 - X)Rlx at period 2. The marginal return 
between period 1 and period 2, R2, is assumed to be 
relatively high in a sense to be described later. 
Also suppose that the preferences or tastes of each of 
the N people are identical as of period 0 and are such 
that individuals are uncertain about whether they will 
want to consume at period 1 or, relative to the return R2, 
will want to wait and consume at period 2. No one 
wants to consume at period 0. Each person learns at 
period 1 whether he or she will want to consume at 
period 1, or whether he or she will want to wait and 
consume at period 2. This is how uncertainty about 
when people will want to spend is put into the model. 
Some fraction of the N people will turn out to want to 
consume at period 1, so we label them type 1 or the 
impatient type. The remaining fraction will turn out to 
want to consume at period 2, so we label them type 2 or 
the patient type. (To be precise, for any amount x, the 
patient people are happy to trade jc units of period 1 
consumption for R^x units of period 2 consumption, 
where, recall, R2 is the marginal return of the technolo-
gy between periods 1 and 2.) In the no-aggregate-risk 
version of the model, these fractions are known to 
everyone at period 0. In the aggregate-risk version, 
which is the primary focus here, there is uncertainty 
about these fractions, the details of which will be 
spelled out later. 
Because each person at period 0 is uncertain about 
whether he or she will be impatient or patient at period 
1, each cares about what he or she will be able to 
consume at period 1 if impatient and also what he or 
she will be able to consume at period 2 if patient. From 
the point of view of period 0, turning out to be impa-
tient or patient is analogous to experiencing an auto 
accident or not experiencing an auto accident. Before 
the event, a person cares about both contingencies, even 
though only one will occur; a person will either have or 
not have an accident. As I proceed, I will be making 
additional assumptions about the way that each person 
cares about the two contingencies: namely, what the 
person will be able to consume at period 1 if impatient 
and what the person will be able to consume at period 
2 if patient. 
Before describing the remaining features of the 
model, it is helpful to introduce the device I use to 
describe what is possible and what is desirable. Suppose 
that there is a benevolent planner (not one of the N 
people), whose goal is to set up an arrangement to make 
each of the N people as well off as possible as of period 
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0, subject to treating them identically as of period 0. 
Suppose also that this planner has control of all the 
period 0 resources, Ny units of the period 0 good, and 
has access to the technology described above. Very 
roughly speaking, what the planner will do is invest all 
the resources in the technology, withdraw some during 
period 1 to allow those who turn out to be impatient to 
consume then, leave the rest in the technology, and 
distribute the proceeds at period 2 to those who turn out 
to be patient. After describing the best planning arrange-
ment, I will show that this arrangement can be interpret-
ed as a mutual banking system that would be voluntarily 
entered into at period 0 by all the N people, if each 
person starts with y units of the period 0 good and has 
access to the technology. 
Two difficulties remain that complicate the problems 
of the planner. First, although the planner is assumed to 
know at period 0 how each person values consumption 
at period 1 if impatient and consumption at period 2 if 
patient, the planner will not know at period 1 whether 
a person turned out to be patient or impatient unless the 
person reveals it. That is, whether a person turns out to 
be type 1 or type 2 is private information. Second, at 
period 1, the planner will encounter the N people in a 
sequential, random order and must determine a period 
1 consumption for each person when that person is 
encountered. This means that if some person is the kih 
person to encounter the planner at period 1, then the 
planner can ask whether he or she is patient or impatient 
and can give that person some amount of period 1 
consumption based on that person's response and on the 
responses of the k - 1 people the planner has already 
encountered. But the planner cannot delay determining 
the kth person's period 1 consumption until he or she 
gets responses from those not yet encountered. More-
over, it is assumed that the N people do not have any 
contact with each other during period 1. This second 
feature is how sequential service is put into the model. 
Before describing the aggregate-risk version of the 
model in detail, it will be helpful to review the motiva-
tion for a kind of banking arrangement in the simpler 
setting without aggregate risk because the same motiva-
tion carries over to the aggregate-risk version. This 
discussion will also allow me to describe some impor-
tant additional assumptions about preferences, about the 
way people value consumption at period 1 if impatient 
and consumption at period 2 if patient. 
No Aggregate Risk 
Since the first difficulty facing the planner, private 
information, will turn out to be unimportant, it is 
convenient to begin by ignoring this difficulty. That is, 
1 will first find the best arrangement under the assump-
tion that the planner can identify types at period 1. I 
will then describe how the planner achieves this ar-
rangement despite having to rely on people to truthfully 
reveal their type. Also assume that it is desirable to give 
impatient people consumption only at period 1 and 
patient people consumption only at period 2. (See the 
Appendix for the argument.) 
The planner could give people of the same type who 
are encountered at different times during period 1 
different amounts of period 1 consumption and of period 
2 consumption. From the point of view of people at 
period 0, there is uncertainty about when they will 
encounter the planner. I assume that people are risk 
averse so that, all else equal, they would prefer not to 
have the amounts they get to consume depend on the 
random order in which they encounter the planner. (A 
person is risk averse if the person rejects fair gambles, 
or buys actuarially fair insurance when given the 
opportunity.) Since the planner wants to make each 
person as well off as possible, the planner chooses an 
arrangement where the amount people get to consume 
depends on the order in which they encounter the 
planner only if that serves some purpose. Here it does 
not. Therefore, I will look at all pairs of period 1 
consumption (for those who turn out to be impatient) 
and period 2 consumption (for those who turn out to be 
patient) that are consistent with the resources and the 
technology. 
The technology limits the total amount of period 1 
consumption, denoted C,, and the total amount of period 
2 consumption, denoted C2, in the following way. Given 
that the planner invests the total resources, Ny, at period 
0, at period 1 the planner has RxNy. If the amount Cx is 
withdrawn for period 1 consumption, then what is left 
is RxNy - C1? which accumulates to R2(RxNy - Cx) in 
period 2 and becomes the amount available for con-
sumption at period 2. That is, the resources and technol-
ogy allow for total consumption pairs, (Cl5C2), that 
satisfy 
(1) C2 = R2(RxNy-Cx). 
In this no-aggregate-risk version, let a be the fraction of 
the N people who will turn out to be impatient, type 1, 
and let 1 - a be the remaining fraction who will turn 
out to be patient, type 2. Whatever are Cx and C2, the 
planner wants to divide the former equally among the 
13 impatient and the latter equally among the patient. For 
the moment, let c/
7 be the consumption at period i of 
type h, so that c\ denotes the consumption at period 1 
of each impatient person and c\ denotes the consump-
tion at period 2 of each patient person. Given that the 
planner devotes all of C, to the impatient and all of C2 
to the patient, C, = Mxc,
1 and C2 = N(\ - a)c2. If 
these expressions are substituted into equation (1), and 




are attainable are those that satisfy 
(2) (1 - a)c2
2 - R2(Rxy - ac,
1). 
All the (nonnegative) pairs (cl,c2) that satisfy (2) are 
shown as the downward-sloping line in Figure 1. 
In interpreting Figure 1, it is important to remember 
that c, and c2 are contingent commodities. No one 
person will end up consuming the amount c\ at period 
1 and the amount c\ at period 2. Rather, each person 
will end up consuming one or the other depending on 
whether the person turns out to be impatient or patient. 
Since each person, as of period 0, does not know which 
type he or she will turn out to be and therefore cares 
about both eventualities, it is relevant to look at the 
possible combinations. One of the pairs singled out in 
the diagram is the pair (Rxy,R2R{y). This is the pair 
attainable if each person owns y units of the period 0 
good and acts alone. In that case, if the person turns out 
to be impatient, the person does best to withdraw 
everything from the production process and consume 
Figure 1 
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R{y at period 1. If, instead, the person turns out to be 
patient, then the person does best to leave the produc-
tion process undisturbed and to consume the result, 
R2R\y, at period 2. No matter what a is, this pair, called 
the autarkic outcome, is one that is always possible. The 
planner, or people acting together, can also achieve 
other outcomes. At one extreme, for example, the 
planner could decide to devote all the resources to the 
fraction a of people who turn out to be impatient, 
giving each one Rj/a. At the other extreme, the planner 
could give nothing to those who turn out to be impatient 
and give R2R{y/( 1 - a) to each person who turns out to 
be patient. Figure 1 shows these extremes (on the axes) 
and all other (c^c
2) attainable pairs. Notice that the 
higher is a—that is, the greater is the fraction who are 
impatient—the steeper is the line through the point 
(/?1;y,/?2/?1)>) that depicts the (c^c2) attainable pairs. 
The Best Arrangement 
What should the planner do? As of period 0, all N 
people prefer the same (c{,c2) pair from among all 
those on the line in Figure 1. That is, subject to being 
treated the same as of period 0, there is no conflict of 
interest amon^ them. So, the planner should simply 
choose the (c1?c2) pair on the line in Figure 1 that all 
the N people most prefer. Assume that the most pre-
ferred pair is southeast of the autarkic outcome, 
(Rtf, R2R{y). This says that relative to the autarkic 
outcome, people prefer more period 1 consumption and 
less period 2 consumption. This assumption, which will 
be maintained throughout, can also be interpreted as 
people wanting to buy some actuarially fair insurance 
against turning out to be impatient relative to where 
they would be under the autarkic outcome. The most 
preferred pair is denoted (cl,c2). 
I now describe how the planner achieves this most 
preferred pair even though people are encountered in 
order and at random and even though the planner does 
not know anyone's type. The planner at period 0 
announces the following scheme. All the resources have 
been invested in the technology at period 0. As people 
are encountered during period 1, they will be asked their 
type. Those who say they are type 1, impatient, will be 
given c\\ those who say they are type 2, patient, will be 
told that they will divide equally at period 2 what is left 
after the period 1 withdrawals have been made. The 
planner also announces that, at most, the total amount 
olNcI will be withdrawn at period 1. This last feature 
should be thought of as a threatened suspension scheme. 
Another aspect of the best possible no-aggregate-risk 
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arrangement is how people care about these preferred 
pairs. One characteristic of the way that people care 
about different pairs (c
ll9c2) is that the pair (c\,cl) is 
incentive compatible in the following sense. Those who 
turn out to be type 1, impatient, prefer receiving c\ at 
period 1 to receiving c2 at period 2, and those who 
turn out to be type 2, patient, prefer receiving c\ at 
period 2 to receiving c\ at period 1. This property and 
the threatened suspension were shown by Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) [and Wallace (1988)] to imply that each 
person wishes to announce his or her true type to the 
planner no matter what the person thinks others will 
announce. The threatened suspension plays an important 
role here because it assures the patient people that no 
matter what other people announce, there will be 
enough resources available at period 2 to give those 
who have not received a period 1 payment at least c2. 
Interpretation as a Banking Arrangement 
It is straightforward to interpret this planning arrange-
ment as a banking arrangement that the N people 
voluntarily enter into at period 0 if I assume that each 
one starts with y units of the period 0 good and has 
access to the intertemporal technology previously 
described. The banking arrangement allows people who 
deposit y at period 0 either to withdraw c\ at period 1 
or to get a pro rata share of what is left at period 2, and 
it has the threatened suspension feature that no more 
than oNcl will be paid out during period 1. Note that 
the bank is like a cash machine, except that it dispenses 
the consumption good, not cash. People contact it in a 
random order, just as they are assumed to encounter the 
planner. Since the bank dispenses the consumption good 
instead of cash and since production occurs within it, 
the machine represents the consolidated banking-busi-
ness sector for our model economy. 
The same reasoning used for the planning solution 
implies that any depositor who tells the truth actually 
receives c,
1 if impatient and c\ if patient, no matter 
what others attempt to do during period 1. By con-
struction, such a deposit is preferred at period 0 to what 
a person can achieve on his or her own—namely, Rxy if 
impatient and R2Rxy if patient. It follows that everyone 
wants to participate in the deposit scheme. Sincec\ly 
exceeds Rx and c2/y is less than R2R{, the deposit offers 
a higher short-term return and a lower long-term return 
than people can achieve on their own. The scheme also 
produces an illiquid portfolio for the banking-business 
sector in the following sense. As of period 0, each 
person has the same deposit, a deposit which permits 
the person either to withdraw c\ at period 1 or to 
withdraw c\ at period 2. Therefore, from the point of 
view of an outsider at period 0, the banking-business 
sector has a potential period 1 obligation equal to Nc\, 
while having total resources at that time equal to the 
lesser amount, NR{y. 
Thus, this no-aggregate-risk version of the model 
displays some of the main properties of actual econo-
mies with banking systems. People hold deposits 
because they pay relatively good returns if held for short 
periods, and this liquidity of depositors is accompanied 
by an illiquid portfolio for the banking-business sector. 
Although a threatened suspension is part of this system, 
it nonetheless cannot be claimed that suspensions 
actually occur. In particular, no one ever regrets show-
ing up to withdraw later than others. To get that proper-
ty to be part of a best outcome, a slightly different 
model is needed. The aggregate-risk version of the 
model, which is the focus of the rest of the paper, 
displays this additional property. 
Aggregate Risk 
Now suppose that the fraction of people who will turn 
out to be impatient is not known at period 0. Assume 
instead that that fraction will take on one of two magni-
tudes in the following way. As of period 0, the order in 
which people will encounter the planner during period 
1 is completely random, which means that all orders are 
equally likely. Now suppose that among the fraction p 
who encounter the planner first, exactly the fraction a 
are impatient and exactly the fraction 1 - a are patient. 
Also suppose that among the fraction 1 - p who en-
counter the planner last, there are two possibilities. With 
probability q all these people are impatient, and with 
probability 1 - q all are patient. Assume that 1 - p is 
positive, but near zero. Therefore, the total fraction who 
will turn out to be impatient will be either pa + (1 - p) 
or pa. The former occurs with probability q and the 
latter with probability 1 - q. 
The assumption about the order in which people meet 
the planner is to be understood as follows. The planner 
first meets the fraction p among whom it is known that 
the fraction of impatient people is a. This could be 
thought of as the normal demand for period 1 consump-
tion. Then the planner encounters the aggregate risk; all 
the remaining people encountered are either impatient or 
patient. Note that I am continuing to assume that all N 
people are identical as of period 0. That is, each person 
holds the following views with regard to his or her 
chances of being a particular type and encountering the 
15 planner at a particular place in line. Each person thinks 
there is a probability p of being among the first fraction 
p to encounter the planner, and conditional on being in 
this first group, each person thinks there is a probability 
a of being impatient and a probability 1 - a of being 
patient. Each person also thinks there is a probability 
1 - p of being among the last fraction 1 - p to encoun-
ter the planner, and conditional on that each person 
thinks there is a probability q of being impatient and a 
probability 1 - q of being patient. 
The assumption that the total fraction who are 
impatient is random seems plausible. The assumption 
that randomness occurs only among the group who 
encounter the planner last is admittedly special. It is 
adopted because it simplifies the analysis. Quite natural-
ly it is assumed that the only way for the planner to 
learn the aggregate state, whether the total fraction of 
impatient people is pa + (1 - p) or pa, is to infer it 
from the responses of the people the planner encounters. 
The critical implication of the assumption that aggregate 
randomness arises from the group the planner encoun-
ters last is that the planner can infer nothing about the 
aggregate state from the responses of the fraction p of 
people encountered first, people who themselves do not 
know the aggregate state. It is also helpful that if the 
responses of people in the fraction 1 - p whom the 
planner encounters last are truthful, then the aggregate 
state is implied by the response of any one of them. 
The Best Arrangement 
Next I will describe the qualitative features of the best 
arrangement for the aggregate-risk version. This best 
arrangement will resemble a partial suspension in that 
those who encounter the planner last if impatient get 
Table 1 
Notation for Consumption Pairs 
in the Aggregate-Risk Version 
Aggregate State 
(Type of Last 1-p People to Meet the Planner) 
Place in Line  1 (Impatient)  2 (Patient) 
First p  cj1(1), 1)  c1/(2), (*(2) 
prob pq  prob p(1-g) 
Last 1 -p  c]2(D, cf( 1)  c\2(2), cf(2) 
prob (1 -p)q  prob (1-p)(1-a) 
less during period 1 than the impatient who encounter 
the planner first. Moreover, the period 2 consumption of 
the patient is smaller when those who encounter the 
planner last are impatient (when a partial suspension 
occurs) than when those people are patient (when no 
partial suspension occurs). All the assertions made in 
this section are proved in the Appendix. 
I describe the best arrangement using a notation that 
describes period 1 and period 2 consumption for each 
combination of two contingencies. One contingency is 
the aggregate state—whether those who encounter the 
planner last are all impatient, labeled state 7, or patient, 
state 2. The other contingency is whether a person is 
among the first p to encounter the planner or among the 
last 1 - p to encounter the planner. The notation is set 
out in Table 1, which is a 2 x 2 contingency table. 
In Table 1, the second superscript on c denotes when 
the person encounters the planner—1 for the first p and 
2 for the last 1 - p—while the number in parentheses 
denotes the aggregate state. As in the earlier notation, 
the first superscript on c denotes the type—1 for impa-
tient, 2 for patient—and the subscript denotes the 
period. The probability (prob) attached to each con-
sumption pair is the probability viewed from period 0 
that a person will end up with that pair of contingencies. 
Table 2 is similar, except that it specifies some 
characteristics of the best arrangement. Best means most 
preferred as of period 0, subject to treating all N people 
identically as of period 0 and subject to all the con-
straints set out above, including sequential service and 
private information regarding type. Each person at 
period 0 cares about all four contingencies because each 
person is faced with the probabilities given in Table 1. 
In the first row of Table 2, one characteristic is that 
period 1 consumption of impatient people who are 
among the first p to encounter the planner is not depen-
dent on the aggregate state. This is a feature of the best 
arrangement because it is forced on the planner by the 
sequential service difficulty; the planner does not know 
the aggregate state when period 1 consumption for these 
people is determined and therefore is simply unable to 
make their period 1 consumption dependent on the 
aggregate state. Another feature of the best arrangement 
is the zeros in the second row. When all the last 1 - p 
people to encounter the planner are impatient, which is 
aggregate state 1, the best arrangement does not give 
them any period 2 consumption, and when they are all 
patient, aggregate state 2, the best arrangement does not 
give them any period 1 consumption. This is a conse-
quence of the preference and technology assumptions. 
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Table 2 
Some Characteristics of the 
Best Possible Consumption Pairs 
Aggregate State 
(Type of Last 1 -p People to Meet the Planner) 
Place in Line  1 (Impatient)  2 (Patient) 
First p 






One more feature of Table 2 shows up in the second 
column. In the aggregate state 2, all patient people get 
the same period 2 consumption. This is a consequence 
of the assumption that people in the model are risk 
averse. 
The remaining qualitative features of the best ar-
rangement are described with the aid of Figure 2. Figure 
2 contains two lines, each like the line in Figure 1. The 
steeper line gives the combinations of period 1 con-
sumption for all impatient people and period 2 con-
sumption for all patient people that would be possible if 
the planner knew at the beginning of period 1 that the 
aggregate state was state 1. The flatter line gives the 
combinations that would be possible if the planner knew 
at the beginning of period 1 that the aggregate state was 
state 2. If the planner had that information, then the best 
arrangement would be two points, one on each line. 
Both points would be southeast of the autarkic point 
[the combination (Rxy,R2Rxy) where the two lines cross] 
and one would be northeast of the other. That is, if the 
planner knew the aggregate state early enough, then the 
best arrangement would have both period 1 consumption 
for the patient and period 2 consumption for the impa-
tient dependent on the aggregate state and would have 
nobody's consumption dependent on when the planner 
is encountered. 
Such an outcome is not possible, however. Instead, 
period 1 consumption of those who are among the first 
p to meet the planner must be the same in both aggre-
gate states. That is, in terms of Figure 2, the combina-
tions of period 1 consumption if impatient and period 2 
consumption if patient in the two aggregate states of the 
fraction p who first encounter the planner must align 
vertically—one must be directly above the other. Since 
the best arrangement does not make period 2 consump-
tion of the patient dependent on when the planner was 
encountered during period 1, the best outcomes in state 
2 have those who encounter the planner first with a pair 
like that shown in Figure 2 on the flatter line and those 
who encounter the planner last with the pair on the ver-
tical axis at the same height. Now what is interesting is 
where the other two consumption pairs are located qual-
itatively relative to the state 2 outcomes—the pair for 
those who encounter the planner first and the pair for 
those who encounter the planner last if the state is 1. 
The best arrangement is the best way of coping with 
the aggregate risk, given that the planner has no way of 
knowing the aggregate state until period 1 consumption 
of the impatient among the first fraction p the planner 
encounters has been determined. In order to avoid 
having all the uncertainty implied by the aggregate risk 
fall on those who turn out to be patient, the best ar-
rangement has consumption of the impatient depend 
somewhat on their place in line. Since people are risk 
averse, making consumption of the impatient depend on 
the random order in which they encounter the planner is 
by itself undesirable; however, having some such 
uncertainty is better than having all the uncertainty 
implied by the aggregate risk fall on the period 2 
consumption of those who turn out to be patient. 
The best arrangement makes period 1 consumption of 
some of the impatient people dependent on the aggre-
gate state by having the period 1 consumption of the 
Figure 2 
Consumption With Aggregate Risk 
W(p-pa) 
WO-pa) 
Possible Consumption Pairs 
- If State 1 Known* 
- If State 2 Known 
The Best Pairs 
For the First/? in State 2 
For the First p 
cj'T H.y/pa 
/?iy/[pa + (1-p)l 
The Inpatient's 
(Period 1) Good 
*ln state 1, all who meet the planner last are impatient; in state 2, they are patient. 
17 1 - p who encounter the planner last in state 1 be less 
than the period 1 consumption of the impatient among 
those who encounter the planner first. This is the feature 
I identify with partial suspension. (In Figure 2, the dot 
representing the consumption pair for those who en-
counter the planner last in aggregate state 1 is on the 
horizontal axis to the left of the first period consumption 
of the impatient who are among the first fraction p to 
encounter the planner.) Giving out less at period 1 in 
aggregate state 1 preserves additional resources for 
period 2 and permits the second period consumption of 
the patient in aggregate state 1 to be higher than it could 
otherwise be. (In Figure 2, the dot representing the 
consumption pair for those who encounter the planner 
first in aggregate state 1 is above the steeper line; it 
would have to be on the steeper line if all the impatient 
were given the same period 1 consumption.) 
I now describe how the planner achieves this most 
preferred outcome even though people are encountered 
in order and at random and even though the planner 
does not know anyone's type. The planner at period 0 
announces the following scheme. All the resources have 
been invested in the technology at period 0. As people 
are encountered during period 1, they will be asked their 
type. Those who say they are ty^e 1, impatient, will be 
given Cj until a total of Npac{ is disbursed. At that 
point partial suspension will go into effect; any addition-
al people who claim to be impatient will be given 
c,
12(l), which, as explained above, is less than c\\ The 
planner will continue to make disbursements to those 
who claim to be impatient until total disbursements 
reach Npac\
x + N(\ - p)c\
2{ 1). At that point a total 
suspension will go into effect and no further period 1 
disbursements will be made. Those who say they are 
type 2, patient, will be told that they will divide equally 
at period 2 what is left after the period 1 withdrawals 
are made. 
This scheme obviously is compatible with sequential 
service and with the planner's information. It also has 
the feature that each person has an incentive to an-
nounce his or her true type no matter what the person 
thinks others will do. Under the preference assumptions 
made, which are essentially those of the original 
Diamond-Dybvig model, I need to assume that 1 - p is 
near zero to get such a truth-telling result. This 
truth-telling result requires, among other things, that 
each patient person among the fraction p who first 
encounter the planner has an incentive to reveal his or 
her type no matter what the person thinks others will 
do. If the person thinks all other patient people will 
withdraw, then the person must anticipate getting the 
lower state 1, period 2 consumption for sure rather than 
getting the higher state 2, period 2 consumption with 
probability 1 - q and the lower state 1 consumption 
with probability q. The assumption that 1 - p is small 
makes these two consumptions similar. (Notice that if 
1 - p is small, then the two lines in Figure 2 are near 
each other.) A more precise description of the role of 
that assumption is given in the Appendix, where I also 
report the results of some numerical examples exploring 
how near to zero 1 - p must be. Total suspension plays 
the same role it played in the no-aggregate-risk version. 
As in that version, it is a threatened suspension that 
never really occurs in the sense that no one is ever 
actually turned away as a result of that suspension. The 
partial suspension, in contrast, occurs with probability q. 
Interpretation as a Banking Arrangement 
In a sense, adding uncertainty to the model economy 
does not change the interpretation of this planning 
arrangement as a banking system. Despite the partial 
suspension aspect and the riskiness of deposits— 
deposits do not pay one amount for sure if withdrawn 
during period 1 and another amount for sure if with-
drawn during period 2—they are preferred at period 0 
to not participating in the production process and getting 
the sure autarkic outcome. These risky deposits should 
be interpreted as deposits in a mutual, as opposed to a 
stock, banking organization. As in the no-aggregate-risk 
version, the attractive feature of these deposits is their 
relatively high return if held only until period 1. Also, 
as in that version, the banking-business sector must take 
on an illiquid portfolio. 
Consistency Between the Model 
and U.S. Banking History 
Since the model was motivated by U.S. banking suspen-
sions in the second half of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century, it is appropriate to point 
out how the model is consistent with aspects of that 
period and with subsequent U.S. banking history. 
The model is consistent with people being willing to 
hold deposits even though they know that a partial 
suspension may occur. It is also consistent with unhap-
piness, on average, after such a partial suspension 
actually occurs. In the model, those who withdraw prior 
to the partial suspension are unaffected; those who 
withdraw during period 1 after the partial suspension 
regret having shown up late (a matter of chance); and 
those who are patient get less in state 1 than they do in 
state 2, when a partial suspension does not occur. 
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However, such unhappiness after suspensions does not 
by itself imply that people automatically search for 
remedies—as in fact they did, following historical 
incidents of panics or suspensions. 
To account for a search for remedies, and at the 
same time maintain that the model is correct in crucial 
respects, I must take the view that people did not 
recognize that the economy as a whole faced the same 
kind of illiquidity problem that individual banks faced. 
This is not unreasonable. Until recently, there was 
simply no available theory to suggest that the best 
outcome for the economy as a whole could be one in 
which the entire banking-business sector is in an illiquid 
position. The remedies adopted in the first part of this 
century—the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908 and the 
Federal Reserve Act in 1914, which created the Federal 
Reserve System—were attempts to provide liquidity by 
centralizing the system. If the model is correct, those 
remedies would not work. 
That, in turn, can help us explain the banking diffi-
culties of the early 1930s. Without claiming that the 
banking difficulties of the early 1930s were the result of 
the kind of aggregate risk in the model, it is possible, by 
adopting a view of those banking difficulties much like 
that of Friedman-Schwartz (1963), to reconcile them 
with the model. Suppose people living in the world of 
the model, and still not having a clear view of the 
overall constraints, are lulled into the view that the 
Federal Reserve System with its so-called lender of last 
resort powers will deal with bank runs—both natural 
bank runs of the type in the model and panic bank runs 
in which everyone tries to withdraw during period 1 
because they fear that others will. But when people 
learn that those powers are not sufficient to provide 
liquidity to the economy as a whole, and that they are 
not protected by timely, threatened suspensions, then 
bank runs of the panic type can occur. 
The model can also be reconciled with the period of 
banking system stability that began with the creation of 
the deposit insurance system and extends, one might 
say, until our recent financial system difficulties. One 
way to get the aggregate-risk version of the model to 
display this stability—stability which makes deposits 
have sure payments—is to put regulation into it. Two 
kinds of regulations tend to produce such stability. One 
is interest ceilings which limit returns on early with-
drawals. The other is the presence of bank capital, 
interpreted as a separate bank liability, which receives 
a return only at period 2 after all other claims are paid. 
It is certainly possible, in the presence of aggregate risk, 
to structure the payments on deposits and on bank 
capital so that all the risk is borne by the latter and, 
hence, by period 2 consumers. In the model I have 
described, however, it is not so easy to have that kind 
of bank liability structure be preferable to autarky. One 
reason this is so is that it gives some period 2 consump-
tion to everyone in state 2, including those who turn out 
to be impatient. A less extreme model, one in which 
turning out to be impatient does not mean that one 
wants no period 2 consumption, would make it easier to 
have this asset structure be better than autarky while 
still implying that such an outcome is not the best 
possible outcome. The best outcome would continue to 
have the partial suspension feature, which means that 
some of the uncertainty implied by the aggregate risk is 
borne by consumers during period 1. 
The model as it stands is not well-suited to describe 
the recent savings and loan association difficulties. One 
view of those difficulties is that they are the result of 
the deposit insurance instituted in the 1930s and the 
relaxation of regulation instituted in the 1980s. Togeth-
er, these two aspects of the legal environment allowed 
savings and loans and banks to take risks with other 
people's money. (See, for example, Kareken 1981.) It 
would not be difficult to amend the model to be consis-
tent with this view, but it would require significant 
changes that are not germane to showing the desirable 
role of partial suspensions. 
Conclusion 
A model of the sort I have described has fairly plausible 
features—individual uncertainty about the desired timing 
of withdrawals, uncertainty which does not completely 
average out over people, and sequential service—and is 
not inconsistent with some of the main features of U.S. 
banking history, including the overall illiquidity of the 
banking-business sector. I therefore take seriously the 
model's implication that a good banking system would 
have the partial suspension property. 
Although the desirability of this property has been 
demonstrated only for a very special assumption regard-
ing the order in which people attempt to withdraw early, 
something similar is likely to emerge from settings with 
less special specifications of aggregate risk. If the 
planner encounters people in a completely random 
order, then the planner will try to learn the aggregate 
state from the responses of everyone encountered. 
Finding the best arrangement for such a specification is 
complicated because the arrangement has to be directed 
both to making people encountered well off and to 
19 learning the aggregate state. If N is very large and there 
is no relationship between the type and the order in 
which the planner is encountered, then it is conceivable 
that the planner can learn the aggregate state from 
encounters with a small fraction of the N people. If so, 
then the planner would be in a position to adopt for the 
rest something like the arrangement that would be best 
if the planner knew the aggregate state at the beginning 
of period 1. That arrangement resembles partial suspen-
sion across possible outcomes of the aggregate state. 
When the planner decides that the number of impatient 
people is large, the first period consumption of the 
subsequently encountered impatient is less than when 
that number is small. In addition, all subsequently 
encountered depositors are worse off than when the 
number of impatient people is small. Here partial 
suspension does not mean that a depositor gets less 
because he or she shows up later than someone else. 
Rather he or she gets less simply because there are 
many others who are impatient. Because the resource 
constraint and the preferences dictate that good arrange-
ments give the impatient more consumption in period 1 
than they get under autarky, the occurrence of a large 
number of impatient people is an unfavorable outcome. 
That fact dictates that any good arrangement will dis-
play some aspects of a partial suspension. 
Finally, it should be noted that the result that good 
arrangements display something like partial suspension 
comes from a model, essentially the Diamond-Dybvig 
model, which was not designed to explain partial 
suspensions. This model was designed primarily to show 
that a coherent economy could be one in which it is 
desirable for the banking-business sector to be illiquid. 
However, it turns out that the preference and technology 
assumptions which imply such illiquidity also imply that 
the best arrangement in a version with aggregate risk 
displays something resembling partial suspension. This 
new result matches some historical observations in that 
it explains why depositors would prefer a return pattern 
on deposits that includes the risk of partial suspension 
to all other possible return patterns. This new result 
from what is essentially the Diamond-Dybvig model 
therefore gives me additional confidence in the model 
and its implications. 
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Appendix 
Proofs for the Best Aggregate-Risk Arrangement 
Here I describe precisely the assumptions made about prefer-
ences and prove the assertions made about the best arrange-
ment in the aggregate-risk section of the preceding paper. I 
also include some examples that allow us to judge how 
stringent is the assumption that 1 - p is near zero. 
I first describe the outcome I get by maximizing period 0 
expected utility subject only to the resource constraints and to 
sequential service. Then I show that this outcome is attainable 
by the planner even though type is private information. In 
particular, I show that with 1 - p near zero, each person has 
an incentive to reveal his or her true type no matter what the 
person thinks others will do. 
The Best Outcome With Sequential Service 
I assume that each person at period 0 judges outcomes 
according to 
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where q{ is the probability that the aggregate state is state l, 
the q defined in the text, and q2 is the probability that it is 
state 2, 1 - q in the text. The functions u' are assumed to 
satisfy the following conditions: u
l(x,y) = g(x + yy), where the 
function g has a positive first derivative and a negative second 
derivative and satisfies g'(z) > rg'{rz) for all z and all r > 1, 
g being the derivative of g and being such that g goes to 
infinity as its argument goes to zero. It is also assumed that y, 
= 0 and y2 > 1IR2. These are Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) 
preference assumptions. 
This formulation builds in sequential service by making the 
period 1 consumption of the proportion p who first meet the 
planner independent of the aggregate state s. It also supposes 
that the only dependence on when the planner is encountered 
occurs between the proportion p who first encounter the 
planner and the proportion 1 - p who encounter the planner 
last. Any other dependence can be shown to be undesirable. 
I want to describe the consumption allocation that maxi-
mizes U, subject to the following resource constraints: 
(A2) C2(s) = R2[NR]y - C,(5)] 
(A3) C}(s)/N = p[ac,
n + (l - a)c
21] 
+ (1 " 
(A4) C2(S)/N = p[acl\s) + (1 - a)c
2,(s)] 
+ (1 ' P)EL ^
2(h) 
for 5 = 1 and 2 and where = 1 if s = h and 0 otherwise. 
The solution to this problem is unique, and some compo-
nents of the solution are easily shown to be zero. First, 
c2
1 (5) = 0 for s = 1, 2 and c2
l2(l) = 0. These follow because 
second period consumption is not valued at all by those who 




22(2) = 0. This 
follows because the intertemporal technology can be used 
to shift consumption from period 1 to period 2 in a way that 
is preferred by those who turn out to be patient. It is also 
evident from the concavity of g that the solution satisfies 
C2
21(2) = c
22(2), the common magnitude of which is hereafter 
denoted c2(2). 
In terms of the four nonzero unknowns—c, , c, (1), 
c
21(l), and c
2(2)—U can be written as 
(A5) U = p{ag(cl




+ (1 - p)[qxg(cl\ 1)) + q2g(y2c2(2))j 
and the resource constraints as 
(A6) R2[pacl
] + (l - p)c\\ 1)] + p( 1 - a)c
2,(l) + R2Rxy 
(Al) R2[pacl
]] + [p(\ - a) + (1 - p)]c
22(2) + R2Ry 
for j = 1 and 5 = 2, respectively. The assumptions about g 
imply that the allocation that maximizes U subject to (A6) and 
(A7) is given by the solution to (A6) and (A7) and the 
following first-order conditions: 
21 (A8) c,
11: g\c\
x) = (X, + X2)/?2 
(A9) cftl): q,g\c\\ 1)) = 
(AlO) c2




Then by (A 13), 
(All) cl{2y. q2y2g\y2c
22(2)) = \  (A20) g'(c
12(1)) < RjJiRtfffd)). 
where is the LaGrange multiplier associated with (A6) and 
X2 is that for (A7). I now show that the solution to 
(A6)-(A11) satisfies the qualitative claims displayed in Figure 
2—namely, c, (1) < c,
1 > Rxy, the first inequality being 
partial suspension and the second being banking system 
illiquidity. 









Subtracting (A 13) from (A 12) and using q2 = 1 - g,, we get 
(A14) £'(c,









 - cftl)] = Sign[c
2(2) - c
21(l)]. 
Next subtract (A7) from (A6) to get 
(A 16) p( 1 - a)[c2 (1) - c2(2)] 
+ (1 - p)[R2cl\ 1) - c
2(2)] = 0. 
Now suppose by way of contradiction that the left side of 
(A 15) is not positive. Then, by (A 15) and (A 16), 
(A17) R2C\\ 1) < c
2(2) < c
21(l). 
By (A 17) and g < 0, 
(A 18) g{y2c2{\)) < g'{R2y2c\\\)) 
22 
Since R2y2 > 1, this contradicts g'(z) > rg\rz) for all z and all 
r > 1. 
Suppose next, by way of contradiction, that c,
1
1
 < Rxy. 
Given the partial suspension property just established, (A6) 
and (A7) imply respectively that 
(A21) R2{paRy + (1 - p)Ry] + p( 1 - a)c
2I(l) > R2Ry 
(A22) RjxxRy + [p( 1 - a) + (1 - p)]c
22(2) > R2R.y. 
These, in turn, imply that c2
21(l) > R2R\y
 and c2(2) > R2R\y-
These inequalities and our presumed contradiction imply that 
s'(Y2c2
2I(1)) < g'(y2R2Riy), §'(Y2c2
2(2)) < g\y2R2Riy), and 




 which again contradicts g\z) > 
rg(rz) for r > 1. 
Achieving the Best Outcome 
With a Suspension Scheme 
I now argue that if 1 - p is near zero, then the suspension 
scheme described in the text gives each person an incentive to 
truthfully reveal his or her type no matter what the person 
thinks others will do. In Wallace 1988, this was proven for p 
= 1, a no-aggregate-risk version of the current model. That p 
= 1 conclusion and continuity of the above solution in the 
parameter p yields the result. 
To see this, first note that impatient people always truthful-
ly reveal their type because they do not value period 2 
consumption at all. As for patient people, no matter when they 
confront the planner the suspension scheme assures that those 
who truthfully reveal their type will get at least c2 (1) at 





l2(l), a sufficient condition for all patient people 
to be truthful is y2C2'(1) > c,
11. From Figure 2 it is clear that 
c2
21(1) approaches c2(2) as 1 -p approaches 0. Therefore, by 
continuity of the solution in p, as 1 - p approaches 0, c
21(l) 
approaches second period consumption of the patient in the 
no-aggregate-risk version—call it c2—and c, approaches 
period 1 consumption of the impatient in the no-aggregate-risk 
version—call it c\. Since, as was shown in Wallace 1988, 
Y2c\ > c], I am assured that for 1  p sufficiently close to 
-'21,, v ^ 11 
zero, y2c2 (1) > c, . 
To buttress this continuity argument, numerical solutions 
for a class of examples were calculated. The examples have Neil Wallace 
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the following specification: y = 1, = 1, g(z) = -z
-05, y2 = 1, 
a = 0.5, g, =0.1, and all combinations of 1 - p from the set 
{0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25} and of R2 from the set {1.01, 




was satisfied. The results for R2 = 1.10 are shown in the 
accompanying table. 
Example Solutions When the Marginal Return 











1 -p  3
1  c,
12(1)  C2
21(D  c\( 2) 
.00  1.0159  1.0159  1.0825  1.0825 
.05  1.0165  1.0137  1.0802  1.0835 
.10  1.0172  1.0118  1.0782  1.0845 
.15  1.0178  1.0102  1.0764  1.0855 
.20  1.0185  1.0087  1.0749  1.0865 
.25  1.0191  1.0074  1.0735  1.0874 
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